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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has juristiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether defendant was denied a fair trial by 
failure of plaintiff to properly answer a specific written 
interrogatory asking how she could have got the jewelry. The 
standard of review Is abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Van 
Gerven, 790 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2. Whether some findings of fact regarding specific 
items of jewelry are clearly contrary to the evidence. The 
standard of review is clear error (lacking any supporting 
evidence). Butler v. Lee, 77^ P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App„ 1989). 
3. Whether some findings of fact regarding specific 
items of jewelry are based upon Insufficient evidence. The 
standard of review is clear error (against clear weight of 
evidence). Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1989). 
4. Whether valuations of jewelry set out in findings 
of fact are excessive. The standard of review is clear error 
(against clear weight of evidence). Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
5. Whether punitive damages are exessive. A new 
1 
standard of review was declared March 4, 1991, by the United 
States Supreme Court requiring careful scrutinization by trial 
courts and appeal courts. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
499 U.S. (1991). The existing Utah standard of review is 
clear error (any substantial evidence not manifesting passion 
and prejudice). Evans v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah 1952). 
should 
6. Whether the burdon of proof on punitive damages/be 
higher than mere preponderance of evidence. The standard of 
review is correction of error. Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 139 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
7. Whether plaintiff had standing to sue under the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code, that is, whether the trial court 
erred in denying defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss for 
failure to join the personal representative of the estate of the 
decedent as the real party in Interest and an indispensable 
party to preclude multiple actions on the same claim. The 
standard of review apparently Is de novo under Shaw v. Jeppson, 
239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action for replevin of his 
deceased wife's jewelry or its value, plus punitive damages, 
against defendant and her husband^ claiming defendant and her 
husband stole the jewelry from plaintiff's residence. Defendant 
and her husband filed their answer to the complaint denying theft, 
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and claiming plaintiff was not married to his deceased common 
law wife, had no claim to the jewelry as an heir or otherwise, 
had no standing to bring this action under the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code, that the value of the jewelry was substanally 
less than alleged in the complaint, that one ring was a family 
heirloom of defendant's family, and that plaintiff made an 
unconditional gift of the jewelry to defendant- Defendant's 
pretrial motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff had no 
standing to bring an action to recover the deceased's jewelry (1) 
under the Utah Uniform Probate Code and (2) because he was not 
married to decedent, was denied on the grounds that plaintiff's 
marital status was disputed. The trial court never specifically 
ruled on the issue regarding standing to sue under the probate 
code, before or after trial. The case was tried without jury. 
At trial the case against defendant's husband was dismissed for 
lack of any evidence connecting him to the jewelry . (defendant's 
husband died shortly after the trial). The trial court found 
there was a valid "common law" marriage between plaintiff and 
the decedant under §30-l-I(.5, U.C.A. 1953, which finding is not 
appealed. Judgment for plaintiff for $7,598.00 for remainder of 
jewelry not returned to plaintiff in open court at trial, plus 
$3,000.00 punitive damages. Defendant appealed all of the 
findings and judgment except the trial court's determination that 
a "common law" marriage existed under statute. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PlaintiffTs "common lawn wife, Janet, died intestate, 
survived by him and her son. (Tr 12, 20, 40, 84 & 85) The son's 
whereabouts was unknown and he was not made a party to this case. 
(Tr 42, 43 & 58) There was no probate. (Statement of Facts at CR 
16) Defendant was the decedent's sister. (Tr 4) Plaintiff 
claimed defendant stole (converted) jewelry from his residence. 
(Tr 87 & 90) The jewelry was the decedent's sole and separate 
property and in her possession at the time of her death. (Tr 78 & 
97) The jewelry could not be found after decedent's death. (Tr 8, 
93 20, 25 & 29) During decedent's funeral the police searched 
plaintiff's home for stolen property but did not list any jewelry 
on the inventory left at the home. (Tr 93) Plaintiff testified 
that he discovered the jewelry was gone when he saw it advertised 
for sale in the Big Nickel. (Tr 89) Also, plaintiff testified 
that defendant had a key to his home (Tr 85 , 86, 88 & 99) , a fact 
not disclosed in his unsigned answers to interrogatories (Answer to 
Interrogatories H5, at CR 67). Defendant testified that she 
searched for the jewelry in plaintiff's home at his request and in 
his presence, found it, gave it to him, and he gave it back to her 
as an unconditional gift (Tr 7 to 13, 20, 25, 26, 28 & 29),'but 
later had a conditiQn in mind (Tr 18, 19, 33 & 34). The items of 
jewelry defendant got and values are disputed throughout the record. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case went to trial because defendants counsel 
could not figure out how defendant could possibly have got the 
jewelry out of plaintiff's home without him knowing it, or at 
least having a reasonable theory as to how it could be done. That 
was the key to the whole case. So defendant asked plaintiff to 
"explain how she got it." From plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory 
No. 5 one would reasonably assume plaintiff had no evidence as to 
"how she got it," nor a reasonable theory on this key question. 
Counsel discovered the Answers to Interrogatories were not signed 
while typing Point I and corrected Statment of facts and Summary 
which is why the failure to sign Is not mentioned before. After 
all this time it is apparent that plaintiff will never complete 
discovery, that further discovery would be useless under the 
circumstances, and the judgment snould be set aside with prejudice. 
The Trial Court allowed that "I think there was more 
jewelry taken than what the Court's been made aware of," and then 
made 
proceeded to make a list of such jewelry It was not/aware of by 
reliable evidence. 
After the trial the United States Supreme Court held 
that punitive damages may be awarded under the Constitution, but 
current common law guidelines do not provide adequate safeguards. 
Before Pacific Mutual came down on March 4, 1991, defendant 
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defendant complained to the Trial Court that existing standards 
were not sufficient to meet the requirement that punitive damages 
should be awarded with great caution. Pacific Mutual indicates 
that standards that require more, rather than less, trial court 
and appeal court scrutinization of punitive damages is the 
preferred policy. 
The Trial Court did not exercise much caution is awarding 
punitive damages in this case, although requested to so do. The 
Trial Court did not even follow existing guidelines to safeguard 
against passion and prejudice in awarding punitive damages. The 
Trial Court should observe the same safeguards as a jury. When 
asked to apply a standard of clear and convincing evidence, the 
Trial Court ruled it would not make any difference in this case 
because the Trial Court was convinced TTbeyond all reasonable 
doubt. As we all know, this is a degree of evidence much more 
sure than clear and convincing." The Trial Court's statement 
reveals prejudice against defendant, and an error of law. 
The record as a whole shows unfairness: conflicts in 
testimony were used as grounds for awarding punitive damages, 
damages were assessed at double fair market value, defendant's 
financial and social position was not considered in 
awarding punitive damages, and the clear weight of evidence was 
grossly exaggerated. Tina may not be any better than the rest of 
us, but she is not as bad as tne Trial Court makes her out to be. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY PLAINTIFF'S 
TOTAL AND DECEPTIVE FAILURE TO ANSWER A SPECIFIC 
INTERROGATORY ASKING HOW SHE COULD HAVE GOT THE 
JEWELRY. 
This :! s d e f e n d a n t s mair 1 point and the main reason counsel 
advised her to appeal. Please note there has been a change In 
emphasis on this point from plaintiff's failure to "properly answer" 
as set -Mil In defendant's memorandum In support of motion for new 
trial (TR 53), defendant's Docketing Statement at paragraplt 8, Point 
13 and Statement of Issues in this brief at paragrapl:i I ,, to 
plaintiff's "total and deceptive failure to answer." Defendant's 
counsel had unwittingly relied on his copy of plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories which ended up In the Trial Court fi ] e « ?R 19-22. 
Under Rule 4-502(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration and that 
rule's predecessors the party requesting discovery gets only a copy, 
not the original of the response, a major defect iiI thj i: rule as this 
case 1llustrates. While counsel was preparing the Summary of 
Argument In this brief he happened to refer to the original Answers 
to Interrogatories which ended up In the Trial Court file at TR 65-
68, and discovered to his astonishment that it was not signed. No 
notice Is taken of the lack of a signature on copies of Court 
documents which are often mailed, out after one of several copies is 
signed without re-copying the signed copy for mailing and service. 
The Rule 4-502(1) Certificate of Service (TR 10) implies there is a 
signed copy or original. The fact that plaintiffs Answers to 
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Interrogatories is not signed explains why there is no similarity 
between Answer to Interrogatory No. 5 and p3aintifffs testimony 
about defendant having a key to his residence. (Tr. 65, 86, 88 & 
99) Obviously, plaintiff never saw the Answers to Interrogatories. 
Defendant filed this appeal based on the substance of plaintiff's 
answers to interrogatories and his testimony to *a fact asked for 
but not disclosed by discovery, having no good reason to know the 
answers to interrogatories were not signed or even seen by plaintiff. 
Had plaintiff answered the interrogatories we would not be here in 
the Supreme Court contending the rules of discovery. We probably 
would not have even gone to trial, not without being prepared with 
some evidence to rebut the key testimony of plaintiff, and then 
not without a jury, had plaintiff answered Interrogarory No. 5. 
Defendant's counsel could not understand how defendant could have 
obtained the jewerly from plaintiff's residence without plaintiff 
knowing it, so he asked plaintiff to "explain how she got It,ff but 
received no answer. Defendant submits the 3-line response is not 
an answer other than to declare plaintiff does not know the answer. 
If a discovery response reasonably indicates the party does not 
know the answer, there is no reason to compel further discovery from 
the answering party on the subject. Based on plaintiff's Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 5 defendant went to trial with the reasonable 
assumption plaintiff did not have an explanation or even a theory as 
to how she could have got the jewelry out of his residence without 
his knowledge. In preparation for trial counsel questioned defendant 
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extensively about how she could have possibly got tile jewelry out 
of plaintiffTs residence without his knowledge because plaintiff 
did not have a reasonable explanation on this point. Defendant did 
not tell her counsel about the key, and her r.ounue] never aksed her 
about keys. The substance of defendant's testimony is she never 
used the key. How defendant got the jewelry out of the residence 
was the key to this case. To try a his-word-agalnst-her-word case 
you must have some credibility. Plaintiff1s key testimony 
destroyed defendant's credibility. Plaintiff's surprise key 
testirrioily destroyed defendant's credibility with a blind-side 
sucker punch, all contrary to the most fundamental requirements of 
Rules 26(g) and 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, w!lich 
are contrued under Rule 1 to secure a "just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action," 
POINTS II, 111 & IV 
THE FINDINGS OP FACT AS TO SOME ITEMS IF JEWELRY 
LACK SUPPORTING EVIDENCE AND GO AGAINST THE CLEAR 
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, AND VALUATIONS ARE EXCESSIVE. 
These points are combined to shorten and sinip] ify the 
argument. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary-
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
Rule 520-0, URCP. Defendant raised the question of the. 
sufficiency of the evidence In the Trial Court, although not 
necessary for appeal. Rule 52(b), URCP. 
The basis of the Trial CourtTs findings must be 
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articulated with detail sufficient to permit review by a court of 
appeal. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
The Trial Court articulated the basis of its findings: "I think there 
was more jewelry taken than what the CourtTs been made aware of," 
(Tr 144) Awarding damages for jewelry the Trial Court was not "made 
aware of" is "clearly erroneous," and that is what the Trial Court 
did. Also, the Trial Court took evidence of fair market value and 
and awarded exactly double fair market value, which is "clearly 
erroneous." 
For simplicity, there are 2 lists of jewelry with values: 
(1) by defendant at page 60 of the Court Record and (2) by the Trial 
Court at page 36 of the Court Record. There is no such listing or 
organized testimony by plaintiff, although the Trial Court did put 
its list together from plaintiff's exhibits consisting of randum and 
miscellaneous documents. Defendant's testimony confirms the listing 
and values set forth in her affidavit at Court Record 60 (Tr 10, 11, 
13, 14, 48 & 55), and her testimony refers to her affidavit at Tr 12, 
35, 36 & 37. Defendant's valuations are based on actual sales in the 
open market. Plaintiff's testimony about jewelry and values is based 
on randum and miscellaneous receipts and other papers found laying 
around the house, Exhibits 3,, 5, 7, 8 & 9, incorporated into the Trial 
Court's Ruling of Valuations at CR 36. (Tr 68, 69, 70, 71, 73 & 74) 
Plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that if he found a jewelry 
receipt, certificate, appraisal, or some such paper, then it 
necessarily follows that defendant converted the jewelry described 
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therein Tl le Trial Court accepted plaintiff1 s reasoi i:5 i i g :I i i .makii ig 
i t s Ruling on Valuations because "I think there was more jewelry 
takte.n ..than what the Court's been made award of." (Tr I1! li) That 
is not a correct application of evidence to the Plai-* !' *' 
testified the value of jewelry converted by defendant "A] 1 
totaled11 was "About 15,000; because they were bought out of my 
retire me i 1 :•, ", (T r 79 ) Th e rest of plaint i f f T s e v i d e n c e c : f 
jewelry converted and values was equally probative. (Tr 72, 7'I «, 
75, 76 & 77) Apparently, the Trial Court found "All totaled , . . 
About 1 5 ,3 000"'! was right on the nailhead because :! f j c I i add the 
Trial Cokrt's total values of $7,598 to defendant !s valuations of 
items returned to plaintiff of $5,700 the subtotal comes to 
$13,298, there being some items sold. 
Examining Exhibits 3, 5, 7, 8 & 9 reveals the Trial 
Court took the highest figures found in those exhibits to 
determine values exactly double fair market value. Exhibit 5, 
selling price $111.04, "merchandise description" 225, Trial Court 
value "$225. Exhibit 7* selling price $407 - 249 , regular price 
$81 5, Ti >ial Court value $815. Exhibit 8, selling price $582.^9, 
regular price $1,165, Trial Court value $1,1.65. Exhibit 9, 
selling price $259.99 3 regular price $650, Trial Court value $650. 
Ti ie ? measi ire < )f value of property is the fair market value at the 
time and place of conversion, the price willing sellers and 
buyers under no compulsion would reach. The Trial Court's measure 
of value is '" . more . than made award of." 
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Defendant complains bitterly that the Trial Court wants 
her to pay for the ring her sister was buried with. (Tr 99) Nor 
does she think it fair to pay for jewelry her sister wore when she 
died and was lost at the hospital. (Tr 96 & 99) The plaintiff 
testified he did not know what jewelry his wife had at the time of 
her death. (Tr 100) The Trial Court did not know either, but 
allowed it was more "than what the Court's been made award of." 
(Tr 144) Nevertheless, the Trial Court was confortable in its 
findings, for example: "In this case, the evidence was so one 
sided that the Court could have found the evidence against the 
defendant, Gina Taylor, beyond all reasonable doubt." Ruling on 
Motion (CR 71). 
POINT V 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE 
The Pacific Mutual case came down after this case was 
finally decided. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 
(1991). Eight participating Justices produced 4 opinions. 
Although punitive damages are seldom awarded and not often 
upheld on appeal they are too often asked for because current common 
law guidelines allow It. Pacific Mutual sends a clear 
message that state courts and legislatures should re-examine state 
standards on punitive damages to make sure punitive damage awards 
are reasonable and carefully scrutinized by trial and appeal courts. 
12 
Pacific Mutual is an acknowledgement that punitive damages are 
allowed to be asked for too often under current common law 
standards. The old common law standards worked very well because 
punitive damages were seldom awarded and less seldom upheld on 
appeal, but now there is a perception that punitive damage 
awards are increasing in number and amounts accompanied by a 
decreasing willingness of appeal courts to overrule trial courts. 
Defendant complains that her punitive damages are 
excessive under common law standards. Under Utah law 
The only limitation thereon is that they must not 
be so disproportionate to the injury and the 
actual damage as to plainly manifest that they 
were the result of passion and prejudice rather 
than reason and justice applied to the existing 
facts. 
Evans v. Gaisford, 2^ 7 P.2d 431 (1952) does not meet Pacific 
Mutual standards, and the Trial CourtTs handling of this case does 
not meet Evans standards. A $3,000.00 punitive damage award 
against a low income, relatively powerless widow with orphan. 
children invites careful scrutinization on appeal. If the 
justification of punitive damages is the promotion of social 
justice, than widows and orphans make relevant argument. 
Singular evidence of passion and prejudice is shown by 
the Trial CourtTs Ruling on Motion for New Trial. (CR 71) 
In this case, the evidence was so one sided that 
the Court could have found the evidence against 
the defendant, Gina Taylor, beyond all reasonable 
doubt. As we all know, this Is a decree of 
evidence much more sure than clear and convincing. 
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As we all who practice in criminal court know, beyond all 
reasonable doubt is a higher decree of proof than beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The use of the words "beyond all reasonable 
doubt" seldom escapes Immediate correction by Trial Courts in 
criminal cases because it implies absolute proof, an impossibility, 
a singularity adhored by nature and law. 
POINT VI 
THE BURDON OF PROOF ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE 
HIGHER THAN A MERE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 
If trial courts are going to start awarding punitive 
damages more often the burden of proof should be Increased as an 
additional safeguard against overuse of punitive damages. 
Pacific Mutual clearly Invites the states to re-think punitive 
damage standards as such a safeguard. This was a his-word-against-
her-word case with a key surprise thrown In to boot. If punitive 
damages can be awarded simply because the trier of fact believes 
one party against another then punitive damages would be open to 
consideration is most cases involving conflicts in testimony. 
Since conflicts-In-testimony cases are resolved by a mere 
preponderance of evidence then a higher decree of proof on punitive 
dcimages would eliminate punitive damage considerations from such 
cases. 
POINT VII 
PLINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE AND FAILED 
TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY AFTER NOTICE. 
This point was made In defendant's Motions and support-
ing Statments of Points and Authorities filed before and after 
trial, but not specifically ruled on by the Trial Court. 
Failure to join the real party in interest within a 
reasonable time after objection is grounds for dismissal. Rules 12 
(b)(7) & 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant has 
a right to demand the real party in interest be joined to preclude 
multiple actions on the same claim. Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 7^5 
(Utah 1952). Janetfs son could have her estate probated and the 
personal representative could bring action against defendant on the 
same claim, regardless of plaintifffs marital status and regardless 
of whether defendant obtained the jewelry by conversion or gift. 
Plaintiff did not have standing to sue without joining the 
personal representative of the estate of Janet. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be sent back to the Trial Court for a 
new trial, or at least remanded with remittitur of judgment. 
DATED: May 28, 1991. 
^Cc-iJ <>( X ^^j. 
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t 
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